I. Introduction
With the force, honesty, and verve that have been his hallmark, Ernst Kasemann refashioned the interpretation of Phil. 2:6-11. His 1950 essay stands as a watershed in the history of the exegesis of this passage; agree or disagree, every interpretation of the passage since that time has needed to face his critique of the traditional ethical interpretation of the hymn. Throughout the essay Kasemann insists, and forcibly shows, that the "ethical idealism" that had dominated previous analyses was misguided and wrongly adduced. But Kasemann's critiques are never written to produce yet another essay ' or to appoint himself sole arbiter of a discipline. Rather, he writes to call the guild of biblical scholars and the church they address to a selfcritical analysis of their procedures and claims. Hence, he tells us:"Occasionally it becomes necessary to elucidate for ourselves, by means of a concrete example, the course and condition of exegesis in our own generation. This is a fruitful and sometimes exciting undertaking, since it brings forcefully to mind not only the problems of the particular text but also the problems of exegesis in general."" Clearly, though it is an exegetical essay, the desire for responsible scholarship is Kasemann's expressed goal in this undertaking. What is it that Kasemann wants us to review? Three things: 1) the problems exegesis incurs when it neglects a self-critical attitude to its procedures as well as its results, 2) a recognition that exegesis is often driven by, and so a result of, dogmatic concerns, and 3) the substitution of the gospel's critical form by an interpretation fitted for general consumption by the public or the church disqualifies that interpretation as true. One can hardly quibble with such goals or ignore their real force, and thus Kasemann's opening remarks bear some close attention.
When he begins to explore this set of problems Kasemann discovers two forces that cause exegeses to go awry: one-if you will-moral, the other theological. The first results from an uncritical production and acceptance of offered readings that result when systematic analysis is supplanted by the use of arbitrary intuitions.5 The second, the theological critique, suggests that religious commitments can also wreak havoc with the integrity of an analysis, unless the interpreter recognizes those commitments as commitments. Thus, he writes that, when the biblical scholar attempts to address the church, "this often means no more than a rather questionable orthodoxy, or a completely inappropriate pietism, and these make even more difficult the return to a genuine relationship to the proclamation of the church. For the gospel, whenever it is proclaimed in its purity, has been a critical matter. Thus, especially in the present situation, a critical stance could well be a sign of true responsibility to the subject matter, and should serve as a protection against mere impressions."6 Thus, Kasemann warns that even an apparently methodologically rigorous exegesis can produce interpretations that are incorrect if they are controlled by covert dogmatic interests. Hence, unless the manner and results of exegesis come under close scrutiny and are tested by open debate they stand the danger of disqualification, whether from methodological or theological quarters.
Kisemann is no prophet, but his words, written over forty years ago, still ring true as a challenge to this generation of interpreters. The present-day exegesis of biblical texts also faces the double dangers of hiding itself from extra-disciplinary critique and an unrecognized submission to dogmatic control. It seems possible that rhetorical criticism (s) can help to develop the critical self-consciousness needed to combat
